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‘Created’ enclaves for enterprise: an empirical study
of Singapore’s industrial parks in Indonesia,
Vietnam and China
CAROLINE YEOH, WILFRED POW NGEE HOW and
AI LIN LEONG
Singapore Management University, 50 Stamford Road, Singapore 178899;
e-mail: carolineyeoh@smu.edu.sg
The dynamics of globalization have prompted governments to re-examine accustomed policies,
and search for alternative strategies, in order to re-position their economies for the future. This
paper explores the spatial context of state involvement in the new economics of competition,
with the focus on Singapore’s much publicized, and controversial, orchestration of its state
enterprise network to encapsulate economic space for Singapore-based ﬁrms to expand into
the Asian region. This strategic initiative is promulgated on the exportability of Singapore’s
‘state credibility’, systemic and operational eﬃciencies, and technological competencies, to
locations where these attributes are less certain. A logit model is applied to questionnaire surveys
culled from Singapore’s industrial-township projects in Indonesia, Vietnam and China and the
ﬁndings are presented. The authors conclude that the strategic advantage created for the ﬁrms
within these privileged investment enclaves, although remarkable, is often at risk from the
administrative complexities, and socio-political milieux, of the host environments.
Keywords: Industrial parks; investment enclaves; Singapore.
1. Introduction
Over the last four decades, Singapore has risen to be Southeast Asia’s premier
world-city, as well as an important base for multinational manufacturing.
Singapore’s reputation for corruption-free1 administration and infrastructural
eﬃciency, coupled with the overall integrity of its legal and ﬁnancial systems, have
played a central role in attracting foreign direct investments to fuel the city-state’s
economic development (Mirza 1986, Rodan 1989, Huﬀ 1995). However, rising
business costs – in the late 1970s and early 1980s – rendered it an imperative for
Singapore’s economic planners to expand the island’s investment horizons through
an overseas direct investment programme (Wong and Ng 1991, Regnier 1993).
The main ideas were set out in the policy paper, Gearing Up for an Enhanced
Role in the Global Economy (Singapore Economic Development Board [SEDB]
1988). The 1990 Global Strategies Conference and the 1993 Regionalization Forum
added new dimensions to these deliberations (SEDB 1990, 1993a), while the policy
documents, Singapore Unlimited and Regionalization 2000, encapsulated the stratagem
for Singapore’s participation in the dynamic growth of China, India, Indonesia and
Vietnam (SEDB 1995a, b). Outward direct investments expanded strongly in the late
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1990s (Okposin 1999); presently, about 70% of Singapore’s outward FDI goes to Asia,
but the relative share of ASEAN has declined with the increased importance of China
and more recently, India. As with inward FDI, outward FDI has been inﬂuenced by
government policy initiatives and incentives.
Often perceived as an archetypal interventionist state (Rodan 1989, Huﬀ 1995,
Low 1998, Blomqvist 2001), Singapore’s strategy to remain economically competitive
in the global economy can be interpreted as the building of platforms for national
growth through the management of strategic alliances and ‘collaborations’ with
private or semi-private enterprises on national economic projects. The Singapore
government’s role as a facilitator and partner is evident from the creation of familiar
Singapore-havens via industrial parks in neighbouring countries and the restructuring
of taxation policies (Singapore Ministry of Finance 1993, SEDB 1993b). The state also
embarked on fostering trusted regional networks2 identical to those within its domestic
market, whereby interlocking interests and perceived commonality of values,
crystallized a system of co-operative competition. Implicit in this stratagem was the
government’s intent to draw on its state enterprise network (or, in local parlance,
Singapore Inc.), and extend this network to facilitate business ventures in the region
(SEDB 1995b, Yeung 1998, Zutshi and Gibbons 1998). Theoretically, the ‘vested
interests’ within the interlinked collaborative system serve to expedite processes,
garner exclusive incentives, and negate inept bureaucracy.
The strategy, itself, featured a plethora of state interventions. Involvement in the
township development is three-fold: ﬁrst, senior politicians are enlisted to negotiate
the projects’ institutional framework (which typically involved garnering special
investment conditions in the host locations), and to secure endorsement from host-
country governments, to give the projects political patronage and protection.3 Second,
‘government-selected’ consortia, typically comprising Singapore government agencies
and government-linked companies, take on the role of primary investors in
infrastructure development. This is premised on the reluctance of private-sector
ﬁrms to take on investments of such scale and long payback period. In addition,
the high risks involved in venturing into a relatively undeveloped and unfamiliar
locale, where political, social and environmental conditions are suspect, compounded
with uncertainty of investor interest, renders it inherently unattractive to private
enterprises. Third, the state actively markets and promotes the ﬂagship projects to
Singapore-based multinational enterprises (MNEs), on top of the internationalization
of Singaporean companies; in addition, the presence of government agencies and
government-linked companies, as ‘business architect’ and ‘knowledge arbitrageur’,
adds signiﬁcant weight to the promotional eﬀorts. This paper, therefore, will focus
on the created variables that this plan of intervention has produced, and that the
involved partners clearly perceive to be key attractions to investors; aiming to test,
ﬁrst of all, if said variables were similarly perceived as such by the resultant investors
in the parks, and second of all, how said ‘created’ variables measure up to the realities
of the host business environments.
In the next section, the authors outline the theoretical considerations that
underscore Singapore’s regionalization strategy, followed by an introduction to, and
explanation of the political and historical backgrounds of, the industrial parks referred
to in our study. Thereafter, we detail the methodology of our ﬁeld research, following
which we present our ﬁndings and the preliminary conclusions we draw from them;
and then, with reference to the empirical ﬁndings, we discuss the issues and challenges
the parks face, and ﬁnally conclude that, while the parks have achieved some limited
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success, they have been, and remain, vulnerable to the combinations of socio-political
and simple economic factors that radiate from their host environments.
2. Theoretical considerations
Dunning’s (1980, 1988, 2001) eclectic paradigm sought to provide the analytical basis
for explaining the activities of ﬁrms situated beyond their national boundaries.
The OLI paradigm was used to explain the ability and willingness of ﬁrms to serve
markets, and to look into the reasons for their choice of exploiting this advantage
through foreign production rather than domestic production, exports or portfolio
resource ﬂows through the interaction of Ownership-speciﬁc (O) advantages,
Location-speciﬁc (L) advantages, and Internalization-incentive (I) advantages.
This paradigm was reconﬁgured to constitute the ‘asset-augmenting’ aspects of FDI
and MNC activity. For example, O-advantages have been divided into static and
dynamic; the former describing the advantages possessed by a ﬁrm that generates
income at a given point of time and the latter illustrating the proprietary factors
that allow a ﬁrm to enhance its incoming-generating assets over time.
Dunning (1998a), Porter (1998), and others (e.g. Jovanovic 2003), have reiterated
the importance of the spatial dimension, i.e. location-advantages as aﬀecting the
competitiveness of investing ﬁrms. Firms’ strategic choice of location reﬂects twin
aims; to not only transfer their resources to the host countries, but also to gain access
to the available strategic assets as well (Makino and Delios 1996, Chen and Chen
1998). Like O-advantages, L-advantages can also be classiﬁed as static and dynamic.
While an industrial township facilitates companies’ resource-dependent operations
with its static L-advantages, the geographical concentration of such activity also
engenders dynamic L-advantages such as asset-augmenting activities (e.g. R&D)
and agglomeration beneﬁts. Given their deeply entrenched sources, these dynamic
L-advantages cannot be easily replicated elsewhere. Although ﬁrms may relocate
knowledge and similar assets, assets with a public good or collective characteristic,
cannot be easily moved (Markusen 1996). Transactional beneﬁts of spatial proximity
of ﬁrms are signiﬁcant, especially for cases where transaction costs of traversing
distances are high (Storper and Scott 1995, Dunning 1998b). As ﬁrms’ core
competencies become increasingly knowledge-intensive, the location in which ﬁrms
locate their production, organization and use of assets emerges as a critical competitive
advantage.
In a similar vein, Porter emphasizes the prominence of location in competitive
advantage in an increasingly complex, knowledge-based, and dynamic economy,
as evidenced by the prevalence of clusters (Porter 2000a). Although changes in
technology have diminished many traditional roles of location (i.e. natural factor
endowments and access to inputs), location remains crucial because of agglomeration
and cluster beneﬁts. These include important linkages and complementarities,
knowledge spillovers, eﬃcient infrastructure and specialized labour (Krugman
1991, Peck 1996).
As created assets supersede natural factor endowments as a key determinant of
location, the roles of governments in advancing the competitiveness of a country or
region within a country need to be altered accordingly (Dunning 1995, 1997a). Inter
alia, governments need to ensure that availability, quality and cost eﬀectiveness
of general purpose inputs match up to the standards of their global competitors,
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create and sustain an institutional framework and ethos that facilitates a continuous
upgrading of the resources and capabilities within its jurisdiction and facilitate, rather
than impede, micro-regional cluster development and upgrading (Dunning 1997b,
Stopford 1999, Porter 2000b).
Singapore’s industrial township projects in Indonesia, China and Vietnam,
represent collaborative eﬀorts by the Singapore and respective local governments
to create location-bound advantages within more uncertain environments, through
a propitious combination of cost-eﬀective factors of production, eﬃcient infrastructure
and management expertise, i.e. supplementing natural location-speciﬁc advantages
with engineered ones crafted to attract foreign direct investments to the parks.
Our ﬁeld research, therefore, tests whether this mix of advantages has been successful
in attracting investment to the parks; and, perhaps more importantly, the tangibility
of, and the success of said advantages in retaining said investment; in the face of an
ever-changing economic landscape and the mixed enthusiasm of potential investors.
3. Singapore’s regionalization gambit
The following case studies of the industrial parks in Indonesia, Vietnam and China
serve to illustrate the prevalence of the Singapore government’s role in developing,
managing and marketing these gargantuan overseas investments. In addition, this
strategic initiative can also take on an uncharted perspective of being an end in itself,
that of exporting Singapore’s expertise in industrial infrastructural development
across the region (Perry and Yeoh 2000). Locations of the three industrial parks are
shown in ﬁgure 1, and their operational statistics are set out in table 1.
Figure 1. Singapore’s overseas industrial parks in Indonesia, Vietnam and China.
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3.1. Batamindo Industrial Park (BIP), Indonesia
The late 1960s witnessed Indonesia’s ambition to develop the Riau islands when
Batam was identiﬁed as a potential logistics and operational base to support oﬀshore
oil and gas ﬁelds. The 1979 master plan recognized the Riau islands with its location-
speciﬁc advantages such as abundant land and cheap labour were well-positioned4
to address Singapore’s land and labour constraints and, more importantly, to take
advantage of Singapore’s established business and ﬁnancial services network and the
city-states eﬃcient facilities for communication, transportation and other services
(Kumar and Siddique 1994, Grundy-Warr et al. 1999).
Batamindo Industrial Park [BIP] was launched in 1992. The Park started as a
joint venture between Singapore’s government-linked companies5 and the Salim
Group of Indonesia. Salim was Indonesia’s largest business conglomerate, at the
time, and had close links to senior politicians and privileged access to the major
investment projects in the Riau Islands. Roles and responsibilities were distinctively
segregated, with Salim providing a guarantee of priority with respect to regulatory
controls, and the Singaporean contributors taking control of the design, physical
development and management of the estate, where it could leverage on its reputation
for service eﬃciency and reliability to foreign investors.
BIP’s ﬁrst tenants were mainly subsidiaries of American, European, and Japanese
multinationals already operating in Singapore. Cumulative investments and export
value in BIP topped US$1 billion and US$2 billion in 2004, respectively, and the
number of tenants has increased from 17 in 1991 to 82 in June 2004. Of these, 39 were
Japanese companies with Singapore-owned companies the next largest concentration
at 25. American and European investors have a limited presence. There is a
concentration of electronics operations, mainly various component assembly processes,
and supporting activities to the electronics sector such as plastic molding and
packaging. There are over 65 000 workers in BIP.
3.2. Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park (VSIP)
VSIP is Singapore’s ﬂagship investment in Vietnam. The plan was ﬁrst mooted in
March 1994 by the then Vietnamese Prime Minister, Vo Van Kiet, and Singapore’s
Table 1. Operational statistics of Singapore’s overseas industrial parks in
Indonesia, Vietnam and China.
BIP (Jun 2004) VSIP (May 2004) SIP (Feb 2004)
Year of operation 1990 1997 1994
Scale of development (hectares) 500 500 7000
Investment by developer (US$ million) 470 400 12 400
Committed tenants 85 138 573
Area taken up (hectares) 320 320 980
Investment by tenants (US$ million) >1000 700 15 200
Export value (US$ million) (2003) >2000 207.6 5960
No. of employees 65 000 26 000 137 029
Source: SembCorp Industries, Ascendas International, and China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park Develop-
ment Company (CSSD).
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then Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong. Launched in 1996, the 500-hectare park is
strategically located in Binh Duong Province, 17 km north of Ho Chi Minh City,
and is within a 40-minute drive from the international airport and seaports. A self-
contained, self-suﬃcient industrial park with prepared land plots, and ready-built
factories, bolstered by Singapore-style management expertise and infrastructure
support, VSIP oﬀers investors a ‘hassle-free’, one-stop service. A 250 000-strong
working population within a 15 km radius from VSIP provides a ready pool of
low-cost, skilled labour.
In VSIP, Singapore applied lessons learned from its China experience, and made
deliberate eﬀorts to foster strong collaboration with local authorities. A Management
Board was set up, chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Binh Duong Province People’s
Committee, which pre-empted the perception that VSIP was a partnership forced
upon by the central government. The Board, with representatives from the Ministries
of Trade, Finance and Interior, as well as the General Customs Department, oversees
the issue of investment licences, import/export permits, and construction permits.
VSIP is jointly developed by a Singapore consortium6 led by SembCorp Industries
and Becamex, a Vietnamese state-owned enterprise in Binh Duong Province.
VSIP’s ﬁrst tenants included 3M, Sandoz, Sakata Inx, Godrej (India), Liwayway
Food Industries, and a mix of Singaporean ﬁrms such as ST Automotive and Star
Chemicals. Unlike BIP, where the focus on electronics and other light industries
complements the restructuring of Singapore’s manufacturing sector, VSIP is less
selective in its tenant proﬁle; the tenant-mix reﬂects the overwhelming importance
of Asian MNEs, while the sector mix ranges from textiles, to electronics and
pharmaceuticals. Singaporean and non-Asian companies are represented in a mix of
industries, while the Japanese companies are largely concentrated in electronics.
VSIP’s major tenants include Konica, Nitto Denko, Kimberly-Clark, Diethelm and
Roche. Investment commitments are currently valued in excess of US$700 million,
in a broad swathe of industries – food, electrical and electronics, pharmaceuticals and
healthcare, speciality materials, consumer goods and light industries. VSIP has
138 committed tenants from 21 countries, of which 80 are already operational.
Some 26 000 jobs have been created, with the number expected to rise to 40 000
when the rest of the tenants start their operations.7 VSIP posted its ﬁrst proﬁts in 2002.
3.3. China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park (CS-SIP)
CS-SIP was oﬃcially launched on 12 May 1994, and touted as a locale oﬀering
abundant labour, and other local resources, at competitive costs, and in proximity
to target markets. These primary factors were purportedly enhanced and strengthened
by world-class infrastructure within the park, strong commitment and support from
the local authorities, and growing bilateral economic co-operation between Singapore
and China. The project was jointly developed by a consortium of Chinese and
Singapore-based investors known as the China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park
Development Company (CSSD). The Chinese partners held a 35% stake, while the
Singapore consortia took a 65% stake.8 The two consortia retained separate identities
and responsibilities, taking up projects according to their agreed roles (SIPAC 1999).
However, barely 5 years into the project, Singapore acknowledged that the
original vision of transferring its industrial-development model to Suzhou was a
much more complex and challenging process than had been previously envisaged.
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Singapore’s disappointment was pointedly highlighted by the then Senior Minister
Lee Kuan Yew’s public questioning of the commitment of the Chinese partners to the
project.9 By early 1999, the township had attracted a resident population of only 5000
against a target of 600 000; the park was employing 14 000 workers, while the original
target was 360 000. The slow progress resulted in ﬁnancial losses for the Singapore-led
consortium, which funded the land development and infrastructure, and also for
Singaporean investors involved in peripheral projects. Oﬃcial estimates placed
Singapore’s investment in CS-SIP at only US$147 million.
These, and other, protracted diﬃculties10 led to the announcement in 1999 that
Singapore would stop pouring in additional investments and, pari passu, would transfer
majority ownership of the park to the Chinese partners, with the latter taking a 65%
stake in the new alignment of interests.11 Interestingly, SIP performance turned
around within a year following the transfer of majority ownership and management
control. Since then, there has been a strong inﬂux of investment. Investment in
CS-SIP currently stands at US$16 billion,12 and 75 000 jobs have been created.
The Park, named as one of nine ‘next frontier tech cities’ of the world by Newsweek,
has established its status as an investment hub for high-tech industries and 51 Fortune
500 companies. A signiﬁcant proportion of the tenants originate from the USA and
Europe, and over 70% of their investments are in electronics, information technology
and other high-tech segments. The completion of the second and third phase of the
transportation network and other infrastructure developments, at an estimated cost of
US$10 billion, is in progress. The infrastructure development for the entire 70 km2 site
is due for completion over the next 2 years. CSSD has plans to be listed by 2005
in China, and possibly in Singapore.
4. Field research
Each of the three industrial parks discussed in this paper has been in operation for
at least 7 years, and are now established parks which catalysed the development of
similar industrial parks (e.g. Panbil Industrial Park and Citra Buana in Indonesia,
Tan Thuan Export Processing Zone in Vietnam, and the Suzhou New District in
China) in close proximity to the Singaporean parks. Analysis of the Singapore-styled
parks, relying primarily on secondary data from oﬃcial publications and press reports,
is not enough to ascertain the situation on the ground. To obtain primary data from
the tenants of parks, we applied the questionnaire developed in Yeoh et al. (2000),
and surveyed the tenants in three of Singapore’s overseas industrial parks on the
diﬀerential impact of various pull factors on ﬁrms’ investment decisions, along with
the diﬀerential impact of diﬀerent types of constraints on their operations.
4.1. Methodology: questionnaire survey
The questionnaire was designed as a comparative study to investigate the various
factors inﬂuencing ﬁrms’ investment decisions along with the problems faced by
their operations; speciﬁcally, to test tenants’ perception of the created variables that
are meant to give the parks an advantage, as mentioned earlier in this paper, as well as
measures of past perception against the current reality. The question sets for the
tenants in the three industrial parks are similar. The surveys sought to highlight
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the diﬀerent push/pull factors facing the park tenants when they chose to relocate
their operations in the respective parks, and the operating constraints faced by the
respective park tenants. The survey focused on three main areas. First, the basic
proﬁle of the respondent: type of ownership, nature of operations, number of
employees, sales turnover and its market orientation. Second, the factors that
attracted the respondents to invest in the park. Data on various constraints was
gathered in the third section.
Questionnaire surveys were conducted in Indonesia, Vietnam and China,
from December 2002 to August 2004. A total of 125 responses were collected from
industrial-park tenants. Of these, 25 (29% of BIP tenants) were located in Batamindo
Industrial Park (BIP) in Indonesia, 47 (34% of VSIP tenants) were located in the
Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park (VSIP) in Vietnam, and the remaining 53 (9% of
CS-SIP tenants) were located in the China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park Limited
(CS-SIP) in China. In all cases, the surveyed tenants were carefully selected so as to
obtain a representative distribution of all tenants in the park across both industry and
nature of operations; to illustrate this distribution, the respondents were further reclas-
siﬁed in terms of type of ownership, nature of their operations, number of employees,
and target markets. This proﬁle is presented in table 2. The surveys were conducted
through face-to-face interviews in the case-study parks lasting an average of 45–60min,
with staﬀ in senior managerial positions or above present in all cases, to ensure the
response of the selected tenants, and the holistic and accurate nature of the obtained
responses.
4.2. Logit model
Apart from analysing the descriptive statistics and popular rankings on the
responses relating to factors and constraints, the logit model was applied to compare
the perceived advantages inﬂuencing the tenants’ decision to locate in the
Table 2. Proﬁle of respondents.
Parks BIP VSIP SIP
Surveyed tenants 25 47 53
Ownership Singapore 6 10 13
Joint venture 5 2 6
Foreign owned 14 35 34
Nature of operation Consumer products 6 20 4
Intermediate products 14 12 9
Capital goods 0 1 5
Industrial services 5 3 26
Others 0 13 15
Number of employees Less than 100 people 1 29 37
100–500 people 11 9 13
More than 500 people 13 9 3
Target market ASEAN 15 18 7
East Asia 15 13 28
OECD 16 9 18
Domestic market 3 29 46
Source: Questionnaire survey.
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case-study parks. A similar model was also applied to the constraints faced by
the tenants in these parks.
The logit model, estimated by the maximum likelihood, takes the following form:
Pi ¼
eZi
1þ eZi
where Pi is the probability of the ﬁrm being located in the particular park and Zi is a
linear function of the pull/push factors deﬁned as
Zi ¼ 0 þ j
Xn
j¼1
Fj
where Fj¼ 1 if the factor j is selected, otherwise it is 0.
0 ¼ a constant term and
j ¼ coefficient of independent ðexplanatoryÞ variable:
Estimated coeﬃcients in the logit model, if statistically signiﬁcant, would suggest
that the ﬁrm choosing that particular advantage/constraint is more likely to be a
factor among tenants in that particular park than in those from the other industrial
parks included in the survey. For example, where VSIP is the dependent variable,
if the coeﬃcient of F1 is positive and signiﬁcant, this would suggest that, after taking into
account the eﬀects of other advantages, a ﬁrm choosing ‘Political commitment from
the Singapore government’ has a higher probability of being a ﬁrm located in VSIP,
i.e. political commitment from the Singaporean government was a signiﬁcant pull
factor for VSIP tenants, as opposed to tenants in BIP or CS-SIP.
4.3. Factors inﬂuencing the respondents’ decision to locate in the case-study parks
(table 3)
The main leverage of the Singapore-styled industrial parks rests ﬁrmly on the export
of the city-state’s infrastructural development expertise, and on the low-cost labour
available in the host environments. Not unexpectedly, then, the reliable and eﬃcient
Singapore-styled infrastructure was the parks’ main draw, with 84, 77 and 72% of
the BIP, VSIP and CS-SIP tenants surveyed citing it as an advantage that
inﬂuenced them to locate in their respective parks. Singapore, then, appears to
have succeeded in exporting its ‘expertise’ in infrastructure development and creating
a location-advantage, which is clearly in demand by companies in the South East
Asian region. Additionally, our logit results re-aﬃrm the importance of infrastructural
facilities to CS-SIP, in particular, with a positive and statistically signiﬁcant
3 (¼1.046); this is due to the park’s need to support more technologically-
sophisticated industries, as compared to the low-cost, labour-intensive manufacturing
activities in BIP and VSIP.
Similarly, another perceived advantage of BIP was ‘competitive labour costs’, with
80% of the tenants indicating so, making this the second-ranked factor; this is not
unexpected, considering that BIP serves as a low-cost investment enclave, and a large
proportion of the tenants in BIP engage in labour-intensive manufacturing activities.
The other low-cost enclave in VSIP, however, seemed to place cheap labour in rather
lower regard, with only 43% of tenants stating it to be an advantage that drew them
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Table 3. Factors aﬀecting respondents’ decision to locate in BIP/VSIP/CS-SIP (by frequency, popular ranking and maximum
likelihood estimate).
Factors
BIP VSIP CS-SIP
Freq. Rank  coeﬀ. p-value Freq. Rank  coeﬀ. p-value Freq. Rank  coeﬀ. p-value
Political commitment
from S’pore government
15 6 2.997 0.007* 6 9 1.462 0.043** 7 8 0.534 0.592
Political commitment
from host government
19 4 0.346 0.695 37 1 1.062 0.123 38 2 1.166 0.216
Infrastructure facilities 21 1 0.722 0.515 36 2 1.005 0.175 38 2 1.046 0.099***
Investment incentives 19 4 0.571 0.524 30 3 0.639 0.308 40 1 0.550 0.495
Presence of skilled labour 14 8 0.500 0.602 12 7 0.133 0.850 13 5 1.241 0.163
Competitive labor cost 20 2 2.186 0.013** 20 5 2.625 0.003* 0 12 22.370 0.996
Competitive overhead cost 20 2 2.880 0.001* 6 9 3.193 0.002* 4 9 0.160 0.891
Access to overseas market 13 9 0.994 0.246 15 6 2.904 0.001* 1 10 4.704 0.002*
Access to domestic market 5 12 2.365 0.040** 22 4 2.002 0.001* 12 6 1.132 0.119
Presence of major buyer 15 6 1.168 0.388 11 8 1.132 0.290 1 10 6.452 0.061***
Presence of major supplier 13 9 0.549 0.691 4 11 3.001 0.001* 22 4 3.488 0.012**
Presence of major competitors 8 11 0.557 0.674 1 12 3.139 0.027** 12 6 3.299 0.122
Constant N/A N/A 4.954 0.002* N/A N/A 0.593 0.468 N/A N/A 0.809 0.353
Source: Questionnaire survey.
p-values are for two-tailed tests.
*Signiﬁcant at 1% level; **Signiﬁcant at 5% level; ***Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
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to the park. Our logit results, however, suggest that this factor was comparatively
a deciding factor between the three parks for tenants in both VSIP and BIP, with a
positive and highly signiﬁcant 6 (¼2.625) and 6 (¼2.186), respectively; a result that
is, however, explained by the simple fact that not a single one of the CS-SIP respon-
dents mentioned this factor, clearly outlining the comparative importance of cheap
labour to VSIP and BIP, as compared to CS-SIP, where it seems to be not an issue at
all. China’s much-touted and much-maligned ‘cheap labour’ was not in evidence
here; indeed, anecdotal evidence from our on-site interviews pointed to a tight labour
market in Suzhou, and one oft-heard refrain suggests that CS-SIP companies have
had to pay a premium for workers with the requisite skills. On a related note, tying
with cheap labour in BIP’s popular rankings was ‘competitive overhead costs’, and
a positive and statistically signiﬁcant 7 (¼2.880) diﬀerentiated the BIP respondents
from those in the other two parks. Signiﬁcantly, in terms of popular rankings, this
factor ranked ninth in both VSIP and CS-SIP, suggesting that costs, overall, seem to
be very much more of a concern for BIP tenants than VSIP and CS-SIP tenants.
Access to overseas markets was rather more of a consideration for VSIP tenants
than for tenants in the other two parks, as indicated by the positive and statistically
signiﬁcant 8 (¼2.904), and in sharp contrast to the negative and statistically signiﬁ-
cant 8 (¼4.704) for CS-SIP, which would suggest a disinclination for tenants
interested in access to overseas markets to locate in CS-SIP. This can be explained,
in part, by VSIP’s tenant proﬁle (comprising mostly Asian ﬁrms) and the Park’s
positioning as an export platform for these ﬁrms into the region; the fact that the
majority of these tenants are involved in the production of consumer products would
seem to support this explanation. It was noted, however, that from our respondent
proﬁles, the major market for VSIP still appears to be the domestic market. On the
other hand, Western and Japanese MNEs dominate the ‘landscape’ in CS-SIP, and
given their established global marketing and distribution networks, this ‘advantage’ is,
in all likelihood, a non-issue; or even less than that, given that the majority of CS-SIP
tenants (almost 50%) are involved in the provision of industrial services, with product
manufacturing very much in the minority. Access to overseas markets is of little real
beneﬁt to service providers, and in fact might create more competition for them;
we note, after all, that the vast majority (46 of 53 respondents) indicated the growing
domestic market to be one of their target markets, possibly explaining the negative
logit results for CS-SIP. It was noted, however, that looking at the popular rankings,
we ﬁnd that access to overseas markets is lowly-ranked for BIP and CS-SIP, and only
ranked sixth for VSIP; despite the comparative importance of this advantage, it is
obviously not a generally major consideration for tenants in the three parks as a whole.
Interestingly enough, while BIP tenants are, unlike VSIP and CS-SIP tenants, largely
export-based, this factor appears to be one that they are largely indiﬀerent to; this is
probably due to the large percentage of ﬁrms that produce intermediate products,
which often are already part of ﬁxed value-chains, with set destinations other than the
target markets for the ﬁnal products.
Another interesting observation, not inconsistent with the tenant proﬁle in
CS-SIP, is the positive and statistically signiﬁcant 11 (¼3.488), indicating the
comparative importance of major suppliers in the production network of CS-SIP
respondents as opposed to respondents in the other two parks, and a negative and
signiﬁcant 10 (¼6.452), suggesting that the presence of major buyers within the
park was, in the same way, comparatively less critical to their operations; perhaps
due to higher-level services and industries that require a range of raw materials and
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quick and eﬃcient supply networks, and for which distance to customers is not an
issue. In addition, the negative and highly signiﬁcant 11 (¼3.001) for VSIP is
consistent with a tenant proﬁle that does not require the presence of major suppliers
for operational eﬃciency. BIP tenants, on the other hand, tread the middle ground;
tenants in this park, it seems, do not care particularly where their buyers and
suppliers are or how accessible they might be, placing only an average emphasis
on either – an observation not inconsistent with the intermediate product-focused
tenant proﬁle.
On a broader front, political commitment from the Singaporean government
was a distinctly more important consideration for BIP tenants than VSIP or
CS-SIP tenants, as indicated by the positive and statistically signiﬁcant 1
(¼2.997). This can be explained by the instability of Indonesia’s political system.
The post-Soeharto era was signiﬁcant for BIP, as many ﬁrms pulled out of BIP during
the political unrest. The situation was further exacerbated by the frequent changes in
political leadership, with ﬁve presidents in the past 6 years. Key economic positions
were reshuﬄed and economic advisors changed frequently, as power jockeying among
the parties, ministries, legislature, central bank, and other institutions continued.
All these serve to complicate investors’ assessment of Indonesia’s political outlook,
making it imperative for the Singaporean authorities to signal its political
commitment to the progress of the Park. In addition, political commitment from
the Indonesian government became particularly important in keeping the tenants’
conﬁdence in BIP. Despite this, however, the popular rankings suggest that this
political capital is comparatively not a very major concern for tenants in the parks
studied; only 6 and 7 respondents, respectively, from VSIP and CS-SIP cited this
factor as an aﬃrmative pull factor, and even for BIP it is only ranked sixth in the
popular rankings; suggesting that tenants were, in general, much more concerned
with operational considerations, such as the reliable Singapore-styled infrastructure
facilities, than with the Singaporean government’s other supposedly major
contribution, its much-vaunted political commitment to the success of the parks.
In contrast, although not unexpectedly, political commitment from the host
government was pivotal to the respondents’ investment decision in all three case-study
parks, occupying one of the four top spots in the popular rankings in each park, as well
as, surprisingly, the host of investment incentives meant to entice multinationals to
locate their lower value-added activities in these self-contained enclaves; incentives
that, contrary to popular literature on the eﬀectiveness of such lures, seem to have
served their purpose quite admirably. Unsurprisingly, our logit results found no
statistical signiﬁcance in the ﬁgures for either of these factors; quite obviously, both
factors are equally critical to tenants in all three parks.
4.4. Major constraints on the respondents’ operations (table 4)
BIP, VSIP and CS-SIP are now established industrial-estate developments, but
the study alludes to some emerging constraints that have undermined the
attractiveness of the parks. These constraints are categorized into three broad groups,
namely, those relating to labour, those relating to organization and technology,
and those relating to the economic ‘environment’, such as government policies and
regulations.
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Table 4. Constraints on respondents’ operations in BIP/VSIP/CS-SIP (by frequency, popular ranking, and maximum
likelihood estimate).
Factors
BIP VSIP CS-SIP
Freq. Rank  coeﬀ. p-value Freq. Rank  coeﬀ. p-value Freq. Rank  coeﬀ. p-value
Shortage of skilled/semi-skilled labourers 1 14 3.870 0.033** 25 2 1.311 0.015** 18 5 0.570 0.355
Shortage of professionals or managers 10 8 2.327 0.084*** 34 1 0.012 0.983 32 2 0.532 0.447
Rising labour costs 19 3 1.909 0.154 6 11 2.587 0.000* 19 4 1.340 0.043**
Low labour productivity 10 8 0.300 0.808 11 8 1.771 0.003* 25 3 2.422 0.001*
High absenteeism 2 13 1.861 0.179 6 11 0.100 0.884 10 9 0.650 0.420
Industrial relation problems 15 6 3.987 0.015** 6 11 0.222 0.765 1 14 0.006 0.009*
Diﬃculty in obtaining
capital equipment
5 11 0.529 0.671 9 9 0.298 0.650 11 8 0.638 0.366
Diﬃculty sourcing raw material 16 5 1.139 0.347 18 5 0.925 0.096*** 5 13 1.959 0.005*
Diﬃculty introducing
new technology/techniques
10 8 1.838 0.172 8 10 0.426 0.494 10 9 0.396 0.611
Diﬃculty sourcing fund for expansion 4 12 1.161 0.432 5 14 0.122 0.874 8 11 0.032 0.971
Lack of good supporting services 11 7 0.646 0.606 16 7 0.108 0.844 12 7 0.263 0.687
High/rising overhead costs 18 4 1.187 0.310 18 5 0.243 0.622 18 5 1.015 0.070
Government regulation 22 1 4.389 0.002* 22 3 1.131 0.046** 6 12 3.153 0.000*
Competition from overseas competitors 20 2 0.061 0.963 22 3 0.432 0.408 33 1 0.458 0.449
Constant N/A N/A 5.891 0.001* N/A N/A 0.093 0.882 N/A N/A 0.156 0.831
Source: Questionnaire survey.
p-values are for two-tailed tests.
*Signiﬁcant at 1% level; **Signiﬁcant at 5% level; ***Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
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4.4.1. Labour-related constraints
The ‘cheap’ labour resources which drew companies to Indonesia proved to be mere
perception rather than reality in BIP, as ‘rising labour costs’ was one of the main
constraints faced by 78% of the BIP tenants. Industrial relations problems
exacerbated the diﬃculties faced by BIP tenants, which perform predominantly
labour-intensive activities, and which are substantiated statistically by 63% of the
BIP respondents; although surprisingly, low labour productivity was only the eighth
most quoted constraint faced by BIP respondents. CS-SIP respondents, on the other
hand, face both rising labour costs, which was ranked fourth as well as low labour
productivity, which was ranked third, with both constraints comparatively more
serious in CS-SIP than in BIP or VSIP, as indicated by the positive and signiﬁcant
3 (¼1.340) and 4 (¼2.422), respectively; the park, however, seems to face no
industrial relations problems, with only one respondent even citing it. Shortages of
managers and other professionals were comparatively less critical to respondents in
BIP (2¼2.327) as, given Singapore’s proximity, the requisite manpower can be
sourced at short notice; therefore BIP respondents ranked it only as their eighth most
faced constraint, as opposed to VSIP and CS-SIP tenants, which placed it as the most
and second most serious constraint that they respectively face; in CS-SIP, probably
due to the higher level of operations among tenants in CS-SIP, and to the emphasis
on service industries as opposed to manufacturing industries, but for VSIP perhaps
pointing to a lack of suﬃcient educational and training facilities to produce the
requisite professional labour. On the other hand, many VSIP tenants did not appear
to face, either generally or comparatively, problems of rising labour costs, as indicated
by the tied eleventh ranked, and negative and signiﬁcant 3 (¼2.587), or diﬃculties
over low labour productivity, as suggested by the eighth ranked, and negative and
statistically signiﬁcant 4 (¼1.771), and also seemed to generally face few industrial
relation problems, as indicated by the tied eleventh rank. Instead (and again, unlike
BIP and, to a lesser extent, CS-SIP) VSIP tenants face a shortage of semi-skilled
labour, citing it as their second ranked constraint; a fact which, taken together with
the above point on shortages of professionals and managers, would suggest that VSIP
tenants in general are facing an acute labour shortage of requisite manpower.
4.4.2. Organizational and technological-related constraints
The Singapore-styled infrastructure, although reliable and eﬃcient, also proved to be
costly, as facilities such as the power plant, waste-treatment system and water supply
are independently managed. This resulted in high overhead costs, especially in BIP
where 74% of respondents cited it as a constraint they faced, and to some extent,
in VSIP and CS-SIP, where the corresponding percentages are 38 and 34%,
respectively, although a lack of statistically signiﬁcant logit results suggests this to
be an equally major constraint to all three parks; taken together with rising labour
costs in BIP and CS-SIP, it would seem that BIP tenants, in particular, are ﬁnding
the promise of low costs that lured them there less than entirely fulﬁlled. Other
organizational/technological constraints faced by BIP and VSIP tenants included
diﬃculties in sourcing raw materials (ranked ﬁfth in both) which, signiﬁcantly, was
not the case in CS-SIP, as indicated by the thirteenth rank and conﬁrmed by the
negative and highly signiﬁcant 8 (¼1.959). Unlike the promise of low costs in BIP,
then, the presence of major suppliers in CS-SIP seems to have been one advantage
that has actually materialized.
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4.4.3. ‘Environmental’ constraints
Government regulation is a signiﬁcant constraint for tenants in BIP and VSIP,
evident from their positive 13 of 4.389 and 1.131 and ﬁrst and third rankings,
respectively; however, whereas 89% of BIP tenants cited this constraint, less than
half of the VSIP respondents indicated likewise, accounting for the positive and highly
signiﬁcant 13 (¼4.389) for BIP, and, perhaps more signiﬁcantly, the negative and
highly signiﬁcant 13 (¼3.153) for CS-SIP. The signiﬁcance of this for CS-SIP is
clear, considering the countless number of incidents that relate back to the oft-cited
‘ineﬃcient and corrupt’ bureaucracy in China; a bureaucracy which seems to be
rather more friendly than its reputation would suggest, or at least, more friendly
than governmental bodies overseeing BIP and VSIP. Competition from overseas
competitors, on the other hand, was consistently a top-ranked constraint among
respondents from all three parks, but was clearly the over-riding concern of the
respondents in CS-SIP where, in terms of popular ranking, it was the most frequently
cited constraint; none the less, logit results were not signiﬁcant, indicating roughly
equal attention paid to dealing with this constraint in all three parks. Clearly, while
government control over the operating environment has proven more stiﬂing to
the operations of the tenants in BIP and VSIP, the economic landscape shaped by
overseas competitors is very much ‘on the radar’ of all three parks’ tenants.
Some 52% of surveyed BIP tenants intend to expand within the Park over the next
5 years, compared to 61% in VSIP. However, 41% of surveyed BIP tenants plan
to retain the current size of operations within the next 5 years, compared to 22% in
VSIP. Only a few respondents signalled plans to scale down operations, or relocate
from these two parks, suggesting a high degree of economic inertia amongst current
tenants. This observation lends support to the Markusen-hypothesis on ‘sticky places
in slippery space’, and is best summed up by the comments proﬀered by an MNE
in BIP: ‘moving to other locations would be cost-prohibitive, given the huge amount
of costs the company has sunk into our BIP operations’. Sentiments among CS-SIP
tenants were exceptionally upbeat, with almost all the respondents intending to scale
up their operations; reﬂecting, in our assessment, the strategic advantages engendered
within the CS-SIP environment, set against the broader context of the dynamism
of the host economy.
5. Issues and challenges
Foreign investment is attracted to investment enclaves or ‘shady places’ (Lundan
2003), and agglomerate in and around centres of international infrastructure
(Peck 1996). The Singapore-developed parks sought to capitalize on this dynamic
by combining superior infrastructure with a plethora of often exclusive investment
concessions acquired through negotiations with local stakeholders. The special
privileges secured by Singapore’s ﬂagship projects were, as noted above, unprece-
dented and unique (at least initially) to the parks, providing an edge over competing
locations. For instance, the parks were allowed to construct and operate on-site power
and water treatment plants, and telecommunications facilities; as a result, the parks
enjoy the reputation of reliable infrastructural facilities in areas where these facilities
are an anomaly. Furthermore, the management boards of the parks usually include
local government oﬃcials, an arrangement which was to facilitate the parks’
privileged access to investment approvals, endorsements for construction activities,
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import/export permits and immigration-related permissions. The synergistic combina-
tion of these factors would render the parks self-suﬃcient and capable of oﬀering
investors the formulaic one-stop service Singapore-styled infrastructure is known for;
service otherwise uncommon in emerging economies beset with administrative
uncertainties. In addition, the parks would (supposedly) attain credibility through
their inherent association with Singapore, which enjoys a positive reputation with
multinational corporations for its stable, corrupt-free business ethos. As well, the
strategic alliances between Singapore’s own state enterprise networks, and its counter-
parts in the regional sites, were instrumental in mobilizing the ﬁnancial resources to
complete these multi-million projects and, in most cases, within a comparatively short
time frame of 18 to 24 months.
Our empirical ﬁndings ascertain the following: the investment-friendly institu-
tional framework laid by the Singapore and host governments, factor availability,
the provision of superior infrastructure and, in the case of BIP, proximity to
Singapore (both physical and political) were instrumental in engendering a competi-
tive environment within the case-study parks. Tenants within the parks reaped
signiﬁcant advantages by tapping into the low-cost competitive environments and
relying on Singapore’s infrastructure, management and expertise. Furthermore,
Singapore’ positive reputation with MNEs for it stable, corruption-free investment
environment lent credibility, to the extent that locating within the parks, in cases,
had the side eﬀect of lending a measure of prestige to the ﬁrm.
None the less, as most openly admitted, even the strategically engineered
inter-government endorsement of the ﬂagship projects, and the enormous resources
mobilized through the strategic partnerships, have failed to shield the Parks from a
gamut of all too practical problems. The following observations update and oﬀer new
insights on recent developments in the industrial-township projects.
5.1. Heightened competition
Singapore’s overseas industrial parks are facing mounting competition from parks
within their vicinity. Competitor parks, some of which are backed by prominent
Indonesian politicians, have burgeoned around BIP. Panbil Industrial Park, for
example, one of the competitor parks and one oﬀering facilities comparable to those
in BIP, is located just opposite BIP; and many of its competitors are able to oﬀer more
attractive rates than BIP, a matter of distinct concern at a time when costs (both
material and labour) in BIP are rising and when cost-conscious tenants, such as those
in BIP, might be experiencing a change of heart. VSIP’s attractiveness has been
similarly eroded by competition from newer industrial estates such as the Linh
Trung Export Processing Zone, on top of incumbents such as the Tan Thuan
Export Processing Zone. Established by experienced and street-savvy developers
from Taiwan, China and Thailand, these competitor parks market themselves
aggressively on price, charging lower transportation fees accruing from more strategic
locations. From the onset, CS-SIP faced tremendous competition from the adjacent
Suzhou New District as local oﬃcials chose to promote the latter over the former.
This competition has somewhat subsided after control over CS-SIP was handed over
to the Chinese partners, and the interests of the Singapore and local stakeholders came
into somewhat better alignment; none the less, CS-SIP continues to face competition
from the nearby Pudong New Area and China’s ﬁve special economic zones in
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Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen and Hainan. These industrial centres are part of
China’s larger strategy to attract foreign investments, and share similar privileges and
status as CS-SIP. In recent years, these locations have upgraded their industrial
structure and innovated on their management systems, rendering themselves
increasingly competitive vis-a`-vis CS-SIP. The simple economics of competition have
called into question the premium attached to the ‘superior infrastructure’ in
Singapore’s industrial-investment enclaves; and all of the parks’ supposedly exclusive
investment incentives will, in all likelihood, prove no more than a temporary
advantage over the rapidly improving competition.
5.2. Changes in political ‘allegiances’
In Indonesia, China and Vietnam, the personal ties that were critical for the success
of the projects at the onset, have declined in certainty and inﬂuence. In the Indonesian
projects, the reliance on the Salim Group was necessary in the context of the
Indonesian system of ‘crony capitalism’ fostered by then-President Soeharto.
However, Salim’s political and commercial inﬂuence has diminished in the post-
Soeharto era. As well, inter-governmental endorsements no longer suﬃce to secure
commitments at the lower tiers of government. Anecdotal evidence from our ﬁeld
interviews points to a more complex regulatory environment for foreign companies,
as they have to deal more intensively with the provincial and sub-provincial (district)
governments. BIP’s reputation as an investment enclave has also not been left
unscathed by political developments in the wake of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis, the
September 11 attacks in the USA, the Bali-Jakarta bomb blasts and negative press
reports on active terrorist cells within the region (Yeoh et al. 2004).
In Vietnam, investments in VSIP were expected, in situ, to beneﬁt from
Singapore’s ability to secure special concessions. These initial expectations now
seem roseate, as inter-government endorsement (in the spirit of ASEAN economic
co-operation) has proved to be insuﬃcient to secure similar commitment in the
lower tiers of government. In VSIP, the inﬂuence of local administrators, and
their interests in competing developments, has compromised the signiﬁcance of
inter-governmental endorsement of the project. The ‘special’ support from the local
authorities has proved to be less signiﬁcant than envisioned. Improvements on
infrastructural projects have translated into a plethora of miscellaneous fees, and
added to operating costs,13 doubtless a far cry from the aid envisioned by the majority
of tenants who were attracted by the Vietnamese government’s perceived political
commitment to the project, who now ﬁnd government regulation one of their greatest
constraints. Our on-site interviews further reveal negative undercurrents over
Singapore’s control and management of VSIP. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
tensions have begun to arise over Singapore-styled management practices, and
these have materialized in perception diﬀerences, protracted conﬂicts and project
delays; although not yet a major issue, it is without a doubt a growing one. Local
sentiments towards Singapore seem to mirror those expressed in the Suzhou-Wuxi
experience in China, albeit to a lesser degree. Signiﬁcantly, SembCorp Industries has
announced plans to divest itself of part of its stake in VSIP14 to reﬂect a better
‘alignment of interests’, even as the project is ﬁnally registering positive returns on
its investment.
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In China, CS-SIP’s progress was initially hampered by an approach that was
unsuited to the local administrative context. Although top-level leaders in China
and Singapore endorsed the project, this did not automatically translate into
co-operation at the lower tiers of government. Instead, local authorities chose to
promote the existing Suzhou New District, arguably on the basis that they had greater
ownership in this development, as opposed to CS-SIP, which Singapore controlled.
Since 2001, this misalignment of interests has been rectiﬁed by the handover of control
to the Chinese, and the appointment of key oﬃcials, previously steering Suzhou
New District, to leadership positions in CS-SIP. The realignment of interests has,
at face value, resolved the ‘paradox of context’ (Thomas 2001, Pereira 2003), which
encumbered the CS-SIP initiative. However, CS-SIP yet shares the political
patronage of the Chinese oﬃcials with many of its competitors.
6. Conclusions
The progress of Singapore’s overseas parks over a comparatively short period of time
indicates the ability of the Singapore’s state enterprise network to mobilize economic
and political resources to create economic space for the city-state. The projects have
obtained special investment conditions within their overseas localities, and govern-
ment endorsements that further underline the signiﬁcance of the projects. None the
less, we ﬁnd that certain complexities of the individual environments, as well as the
rude intrusion of the economics of competition, have hindered the progress and
aﬀected the commercial eﬀectiveness of the parks.
In Indonesia, BIP has attracted a signiﬁcant level of foreign investments, fulﬁlling
the intended niche of accommodating industrial investments from investors that are
most at risk from administrative uncertainties, and lending credence to Singapore’s
positive reputation with the multinationals. BIP is now a well-established project, but
it has not necessarily achieved all its development goals. It has been a springboard
for Singapore-Indonesian co-operation in Indonesia’s Riau Province, but it is not
yet clear that Singapore has obtained the resource beneﬁts looked for. BIP has been
struggling to gain investment momentum, arising both from the increased competition
for foreign investments and the restricted appeal of its operating conditions.
The promised cost advantages of BIP have been less than evident, and over the longer
term, the political uncertainties and policy nuances that radiate from Jakarta are
unlikely to add to investor conﬁdence. As gleaned from our on-site interviews, BIP
would currently seem to have economic inertia on its side, as tenants ﬁnd the cost of
moving prohibitive; but this is, unquestionably, not truly an ‘advantage’. Inertia, after
all, is hardly an attractive force; 41% of our BIP-based respondents can attest to that.
In Vietnam, Singapore’s investment in VSIP takes on an added dimension of
rendering development assistance to an ASEAN partner, overtly to foster greater
bilateral ties. It is apparent from the mix of ‘targeted’ industries, and the style of
park management and operations, that the intention is for the local partners to have
a stronger sense of ownership of the project. The focus on speciﬁc industries that
complement Singapore’s economic restructuring is absent, unlike in BIP. All the
same, underlying vested interests to secure the city-state’s economic interests can be
associated with this seeming act of camaraderie. Notwithstanding these explicit and
implicit objectives, we submit that heightened competition and endemic corruption in
the host environment work in tandem to test this strategic initiative; a combination
496 CAROLINE YEOH ET AL.
of rising overhead costs and a tight labour market, together with rather more anaemic
support from local authorities than anticipated by investors are placing growing
pressure on the park and its tenants. None the less, the park’s competitiveness,
while dented, is still intact, and remains a draw to potential tenants.
In China, CS-SIP can be perceived as a strategic thrust by the Singapore
government to capitalize upon ﬁrst-mover advantages in a regional economy with
immense market potential. As the ﬁrst entrant to develop and manage a state-
of-the-art industrial park, CS-SIP could arguably enhance Singapore’s reputation
for infrastructure eﬃciency and corrupt-free administration. More subtly, its apparent
success would leverage various Singapore companies’ foray into leverage, Singaporean
companies’ foray into China’s aggressive infrastructure plans and commercial-
residential township projects. Following the handover to the Chinese partners,
CS-SIP has indeed been doing very well for itself, as can be seen both from its
‘paper results’, and from the upbeat tone of the respondents from the park.
However, several labour issues remain to be resolved, as well as the endemic
‘Singapore-symptomatic’ problem of rising overhead costs; minor issues that might
as yet balloon into major ones as more and more global entrants seek to tap on China’s
enormous domestic potential, much as CS-SIP is doing.
To summarize, then, our study suggests the theorizations that underscored
Singapore’s regionalization stratagem and, pari passu, the strategic advantage created
for the ﬁrms within these privileged investment enclaves, although remarkable
and unquestionably tangible, are often at risk from the administrative complexities
and socio-political milieux, that radiate from the host environments. Our paper
contends that Singapore’s calculated, schematized eﬀorts at transborder industriali-
zation, in concert with regional governments and business elites, have been overly
optimistic, more often than not frustrated by the intricacies of socio-political and
economic realities in the host economies; and that the Singapore formula, applied
to the variables of economic competition in these host economies, have proven to add
up to rather diﬀerent results. That said, oﬃcial commitment to Singapore’s regionali-
zation initiatives remains, as does the willingness of Singapore’s planners to search for
alternative strategies to re-position regionalization eﬀorts. Perhaps, in the process
of re-thinking these initiatives, the ‘real politik’ of transferring ‘Singapore
Unlimited’ to emerging economies will elicit a more incisive scrutiny; one, perhaps,
along slightly more economic and case-speciﬁc lines.
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Notes
1. Singapore was ranked ﬁfth, behind Finland, New Zealand, Denmark and Iceland, in Transparency
International’s Corruption Perception Index 2004.
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2. The stress of exploiting personal ties accords with business practices preferred by the linked communities
of ‘overseas Chinese’ (Brown 1998), which Singapore made use of in its industrial parks in Indonesia
and China.
3. Mechanisms include familiarization tours, formal and informal contacts amongst government oﬃcials,
the constitution of ad hoc problem-solving committees, and visits by ministerial delegations that empha-
size the establishment of interpersonal relationships.
4. The cataclysmic collapse of oil prices in the early 1980s impressed upon Indonesia’s economic planners
the need for a more broad-based development strategy. The Riau islands were an obvious choice to
encourage investments not least because Singapore has shown interest in leasing these nearby islands
to transcend the city-state’s need for inexpensive land and labour. By the late 1980s, the perception from
Jakarta was that Singapore was ‘bursting at the seams’, and that the time was right to position Batam
and the other Riau islands to take advantage of the spill-over from Singapore.
5. The Singaporean consortium was led by Singapore Technologies Industrial Corporation (now
SembCorp Industries) and Jurong Town Corporation, Singapore’s main industrial estate infrastructure
developer.
6. Other members include Temasek Holdings, Ascendas International, United Overseas Land, Salim’s
KMP Group and Mitsubishi Corporation.
7. VSIP Fact Sheet, May 2004.
8. The Chinese consortia’s 35% stake was shared amongst 12 organizations, mainly national state-owned
enterprises and investment companies of the Suzhou city, Jiangsu province. The Singapore consortium’s
65% stake was distributed amongst 24 organizations, mainly Singapore GLCs, and the Salim Group
(through a subsidiary, KMP China Investments).
9. S. M. Lee unhappy over Suzhou park progress, The Straits Times, 5 December 1997.
10. This is now an extensive literature on the problems encountered in the China-Singapore Suzhou
Industrial Park project including scholarly works (Pereira 2003); feature articles in popular magazines
such as Asia Week, Far Eastern Economic Review, Fortune, Forbes and The Economist, and an unpublished
(conﬁdential) report commissioned by the Singapore government.
11. The Suzhou experiment, The Straits Times, 30 June 1999; Singapore drops control of Suzhou Park,
South China Morning Post, 29 June 1999.
12. Suzhou Park: 10 Years on, The Business Times, 9 June 2004.
13. Corruption remains endemic. The Vietnamese government itself recently estimated that light-ﬁngered
bureaucrats creamed oﬀ at least 20% of the infrastructure spending, The Economist, 14 September 2002.
14. SembCorp Park Viet venture turns proﬁtable, The Straits Times, 1 December 2003.
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